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Trade: Pouring Oil on Troubled Waters?
1 
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Abstract  
We analyse trade between countries of the Council of Mutual Economic Assistance in Eastern Europe 
between 1950 and 1990. Despite central planning of the CMEA, we show that trade could be 
explained by standard demand factors surprisingly well. We document that the oil price crisis had 
several repercussions on Eastern Europe. The Soviet Union as a supplier of crude oil benefited from 
the energy crisis in the 1970s. By contrast, the individual CMEA countries in Central Europe did not 
enjoy improved terms of trade with the rest of the world and the CMEA as a whole responded to the 
oil crisis by intensifying intra-CMEA trade and turning inwards.  
JEL-Numbers: F14, C22, N74.  
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1.  Introduction 
This paper analyses structural change in Soviet foreign trade with the other 
member countries of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA). The 
CMEA was a unique economic confederation, which was the subject for intense 
and often controversial analyses by both CMEA and Western economists, but 
also sociologists and historians. We build on this research of the CMEA and 
study trade in the CMEA over the entire period of its existence using modern 
econometric methods (panel estimation, tests of structural breaks). Our main 
focus is on the impact of the oil crisis on the CMEA.  
Although the system of trade in the CMEA was established according to 
Soviet political targets in its antagonism with the US, this decision had many 
economic implications. The defining feature of CMEA foreign trade was that it 
should protect the economies from unpredictable external influences. Through 
the state monopoly on foreign trade central planners wanted to secure control of 
the channels of foreign impact. Pursuing autarky and avoiding uncertainty in this 
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way, however, imposed significant costs on central planning, because among 
other factors it limited the ability to adjust to new conditions.  
The oil crisis of 1973 underscored an emerging structural crisis in the world 
economy in general which was followed by a radical change from the old 
technological regime. At the time, Soviet press declared that the oil crisis had not 
affected the CMEA. However, a change in the general level of world prices, as 
was the case in 1973, was one of the channels identified which could impact 
planned economies despite their monopoly on foreign trade. Furthermore, 
energy played a particular role in CMEA trade as CMEA member states were 
dependent on the Soviet Union for energy exports. We confirm a structural break 
in CMEA trade in 1973.  
The next section provides a brief sketch of the history of the CMEA in so 
far as it is relevant to structural change, i.e. drawing attention to the main phases 
of development and analyzing internal and external sources of structural change. 
Section 3 portrays and discusses the particular role of energy in intra-CMEA 
trade. Section 4 provides the econometric analysis of structural change in Soviet 
foreign trade with the CMEA countries and leads to the conclusions in the last 
section.  
2.  Historical Background 
Until World War II the Soviet Union was the only planned economy and 
pursued economic success as defined by socialism in the form of modernisation 
and industrialisation. Trade was a means to meet the overall plan. Imports were 
the means to accelerate domestic industrialisation, exports the necessary 
expenditure of domestic resources to obtain these imports (Smith 1993, p. 43). In 
reality, however, the difference between world market and domestic prices was 
covered by the state budget: Isolation ultimately created macroeconomic 
disequilibria. 
After World War II Communist regimes were set up in all Eastern 
European countries that fell under the Soviet sphere of influence. The central 
planning system was imposed according to the Soviet model across these states 
despite great differences in economic preconditions. In addition to refusing 
Marshall Aid, none of the Eastern European states participated in international 
economic organisations, established after the War, such as the IMF.  
In early January 1949, an article in Pravda reported the establishment of the 
CMEA. Its founding members were the Soviet Union, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, 
Hungary, Poland, and Romania. Albania joined in February 1949 and the GDR in 
September 1950. Three more countries outside Europe joined much later: 
Mongolia in 1962, Cuba in 1972, and Vietnam in 1978. From 1965 onwards 
Yugoslavia had associate status. In the announcement of its foundation the 
CMEA explicitly distanced itself from the Marshall Plan, which it saw as violating 
national sovereignty. The Pravda article stressed the equality of all CMEA E. Beckmann, J. Fidrmuc, Oil Price Shock and Structural Changes in CMEA Trade 
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members, and stated the aims of this new organization rather vaguely as an 
increase in economic cooperation and mutual aid (International Arts and Sciences 
Pr., 1974).  
In contrast to other economic confederations the CMEA was unique in its 
structure, consisting as it did of one superpower and several small countries at 
very diverse levels of economic development. Its member countries had fairly 
low levels of mutual trade before World War II, so that the CMEA’s 
establishment entailed a considerable redirection of trade flows from the pre-war 
West-orientation.  
Integration within the CMEA was initially very limited (Kaser, 1969, Wiles, 
1969). Joint CMEA activities amounted mainly to the unification of statistical 
reporting systems, collecting members’ plans and recording trade (Smith 1983, p. 
174). Member states were encouraged to aim for economic autarky and to pursue 
economic development according to the Soviet model, i.e. rapid industrialisation 
with the main emphasis on heavy industry. The Eastern European economies 
achieved very high annual growth rates – on average 23.5% between 1947 and 
1950 (Zwass 1989, p. 24). As in the Soviet Union, relocation of labour from 
agriculture to industrial production and exploitation of domestic raw materials 
were the foundation for growth. Owing to this extensive industrialisation a radial 
pattern of bilateral trade developed with the Soviet Union in the centre as key 
supplier of energy and raw materials and importer of industrial products. The 
East European economies were not integrated with each other through this 
pattern of trade. 
The CMEA only began its active existence after the death of Stalin. 
Opposition movements and the open protests which erupted then were in part 
driven by economic grievances. Subsequent discussions on how to reform the 
economy and measures undertaken could be broadly summarized as an 
attempted change from extensive industrialisation to intensive development but 
varied a great deal across countries. In consequence to Eastern European 
“crises”, especially the Polish and Hungarian ones in 1956, the planning systems 
of the CMEA member states became much more diverse and more difficult to 
unite in one economic organisation.  
The CMEA from the 1950s onwards also began a reform process designed 
to intensify intra-CMEA relations. Initial measures – the abolition of reparations 
and improvement of terms of trade – reduced the share of the economic burden 
carried by Eastern Europe. Subsequent reforms had the goal of greater 
integration within the CMEA leading to greater efficiency through the division of 
labour and specialisation of countries according to natural endowments and 
ultimately establishing a trading pattern which would genuinely integrate the 
partners. However, in contrast to market economies the CMEA did not rely on 
comparative advantage. In the absence of markets, the aims of the CMEA had to 
be achieved by administrative measures.  EJCE, vol.9, n.1 (2012) 
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With the CMEA Statutes or Charter of 1959 reform of the rudimentary 
institutional structure of the CMEA was initiated.4 Joint production projects were 
the second major reform effort aimed at integrating the CMEA. For example, the 
“Basic Principles of the International Socialist Division of Labour” of 1962 saw 
coordination of national plans as the primary means for achieving the division of 
labour. The second major joint action programme, the “Comprehensive 
Programme for the Further Extension and Improvement of Cooperation and the 
Development of Socialist Economic Integration” adopted in 1971, placed the 
emphasis on “integration” of the socialist bloc instead of on the division of 
labour (Zwass 1989).  
Gorbachev’s coming to power in 1985 did not mark a sharp turning point 
in CMEA reforms either. Broadly speaking, reforms of the foreign trade system 
under Gorbachev were aimed at streamlining administrative and operative 
mechanisms and improving bureaucratic efficiency. The establishment of joint 
ventures was permitted and so called “free enterprise zones” established (Smith 
1993, p. 127). The connection to the central planning system and the state 
monopoly on foreign trade were left untouched. Nevertheless, Gorbachev’s new 
foreign policy of pursuing reconciliation with the West was important for CMEA 
relations. Eastern Europe and with it the CMEA had lost its priority status.  
In summary, none of these reforms, aimed at radical permanent change; 
rather they were designed as a continuous reform process with far-reaching goals 
and development plans for up to 20 years and a smooth increase of foreign trade. 
In particular, they were never designed to end central planning and the state 
monopoly on foreign trade.  
This fundamental decision to disallow the market to operate as a resource 
allocator required that the CMEA had to develop its own pricing system. The 
CMEA based its prices on international free market prices, and converted these 
into ‘transferable roubles’. The transferable rouble was a notional, non-
convertible currency unit which was used only for the settlement of accounts in 
CMEA trade. Goods were divided into hard and soft goods. Hard goods were 
raw materials and products for which the quality and price on the world market 
was known. Soft goods were manufactured products, which varied greatly in 
quality and prices were not easily determined by identifying a comparable product 
on the world market. The actual price of a traded good was established in 
bilateral bargaining agreements. Prices for one and the same good could vary a 
great deal between bilateral trade agreements. Overall analyses of the CMEA 
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designed as an international clearing bank. In 1970 the International Investment Bank was established. 
The CMEA members contributed capital to this bank according to their share in Intra-CMEA trade. 
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pricing system conclude that hard goods tended to be under-priced and soft 
goods over-priced. The fact that trading profits or losses could not ultimately be 
established remained a source of conflict. Both Western economists and Soviet 
and East European planning officials estimated the loss or profit of CMEA 
member countries using various methods, and reaching highly divergent results. 
Among these controversies, the one about the energy price charged by the Soviet 
Union which evolved around Marrese and Vanous (1983) – addressed in more 
detail in the next section – even survived the existence of the CMEA itself 
(Brada, 1993).  
Until 1991 there were 6 different systems of establishing prices for intra-
CMEA trade based on world market prices, but these changes never touched the 
essence of the pricing system. At the 45th meeting of the CMEA in January 1990 
in Sofia (immediately after the beginning of economic reforms in all Eastern 
European countries) the inherited institutional framework of the CMEA was 
viewed as a barrier to future developments and unanimous agreement reached to 
switch all trade to hard currency trade. A commission was instituted which would 
oversee this fundamental restructuring of the entire CMEA. In the end, the 
dissolution of the CMEA was precipitated even faster than the member states 
may have foreseen in 1990. All trade was converted to hard currency by the 
beginning of 1991.  
3.  The Energy Crisis and its consequences for the CMEA 
As described above, CMEA trade was characterized by a radial pattern of 
trade with the Soviet Union in the centre as the main provider of raw materials 
and energy. The rapid industrialisation pursued in Eastern Europe and the quasi 
war-like preparations during the Cold War necessitated an extensive use of 
energy and energy resources. In the 1950s coal was the predominant energy 
source (68%), this share dropping to around 20% during the 1960s and 1970s 
(IMF, 1991, p. 183). As the emphasis in industrial production began to change, 
oil and to a lesser degree gas became more significant as energy sources, as well 
as gaining significance as raw materials for industrial production. Eastern 
European states, especially Poland and Czechoslovakia, were initially net coal 
exporters to the Soviet Union. By the early 1960s, partly due to the shift in the 
composition of energy consumption, they had become dependent on the Soviet 
Union for oil and gas (Balmaceda 2004, p. 163). In 1973, the smaller CMEA 
member states were receiving between 80 and 90% of their overall oil imports 
from the Soviet Union. By the mid-1960s, moreover, readily accessible Soviet 
resources were beginning to be depleted and extraction had to be moved to 
remoter regions of Siberia. The cost of exploration and extraction in these 
regions was much higher and the distance of transportation sharply increased 
even within the Soviet Union from an average of only 80km in 1970, to 1910km 
in 1980, and to 2350km in 1988 (Smith 1993, p.9). The cost of energy, therefore, 
had been on the agenda of the CMEA for a while before the oil crisis.  EJCE, vol.9, n.1 (2012) 
 
 
 
Available online at http://eaces.liuc.it 
36 
As all other prices, prices for raw materials were established in the bilateral 
bargaining system, with the prices for fuel and raw materials generally below 
world market prices. The oil crisis sharply augmented the difference between the 
world market and intra-CMEA price levels. The price increase on the world 
market radically improved the terms of trade for the Soviet Union in relation to 
Western countries (Marer et.al. 1992, p. 208). The subsequent increase in hard 
currency revenue contributed to the Soviet economy’s stability at a time when 
Western economies were in shock. None of the other CMEA member states, 
however, could “smooth” their domestic economic problems due to improved 
terms of trade with the West.  
In reaction to the oil crisis, the so-called Bucharest principle of fixed prices 
was amended in 1975 to a 5 year moving average. This meant a distinct though 
slightly delayed and smoother increase in prices for energy in the CMEA. The 
East European CMEA member states had different options to react to this: 
Firstly, increase purchases from non-CMEA suppliers, or secondly, increase 
domestic extraction and improve energy efficiency. In relation to the Soviet 
Union, they could thirdly increase their exports5 to the Soviet Union to 
compensate for higher raw material prices and thus achieve a balanced import-
export ratio (see Figure 1 for actual development). Alternatively they could run 
up a deficit with the Soviet Union, or increase participation in extracting and 
transporting Soviet fuels.  
It has been a matter of great controversy whether the Soviet Union used 
energy prices as a policy tool in bilateral negotiations already before the energy 
crisis and afterwards shielded some countries more than others from the sharp 
increase in oil prices. Orthodoxy had always assumed that terms of trade in intra-
CMEA trade had been favourable to the Soviet Union, that the Soviet Union had 
been exploiting other CMEA members and that it was able to do so because of 
its military power. Marrese and Vanous (1983) sparked off a debate arguing that 
the Soviet Uniont was providing implicit trade subsidies to the rest of the 
CMEA. They argued that the commodity structure of trade was unfavourable for 
the Soviet Union in that the Soviet Union exported hard goods and received soft 
goods in return, and that the pricing of this trade added to the disadvantage 
because the Soviet Union could have earned a much higher price for its raw 
materials on the world market.  
The debate continued even after the CMEA had ceased to exist. The crux 
of the debate was calculating the cost of trading within the CMEA. Using 
disaggregate trade data for Hungary, Poland, and the Soviet Union, Marrese and 
Wittenberg (1992) compare goods prices which were traded both within the 
CMEA and with Western countries. Like Marrese and Vanous (1983) they 
interpret the estimated subsidy as a sign that the Soviet Union maximized its 
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utility function incorporating military, political and ideological as well as 
economic variables. In short, that this “implicit subsidy” was a deliberate policy 
pursued by the Soviet Union in the Brezhnev era. 
Holzman and Brada, on the other hand supported the “customs union 
hypothesis”. As Brada (1993) argues, the “subsidies” resulted from the fact that 
the CMEA was a customs union. In pursuing autarky from the rest of the world, 
this customs union imposed import and export controls and only traded with the 
rest of the world when demand could not be met or supply absorbed within the 
CMEA. The “subsidies” were costs which arose by not trading on the world 
market according to comparative advantage (Marrese and Wittenberg, 1992, p.3). 
Lavigne (1984) argues along similar lines when she states that the “subsidy” was 
not deliberate but rather a result of the price-setting mechanisms of intra-CMEA 
trade. 
Both the “subsidy” and the “customs union” proponents were criticized on 
methodological grounds regarding the choice of comparable world market prices 
and the quality discount factor introduced in estimating the soft goods prices. 
However, the very wording of “subsidy” implies overall benefits and losses of the 
trading partners. This is, of course, a much broader issue, which would need to 
take both dynamic and static efficiency losses into consideration. Ultimately, such 
an analysis would have to take into consideration the fact that the planning 
system did not exist in the CMEA member states before World War II and 
would need to hypothesise an alternative path of development according to 
market principles and liberalized trading mechanisms. 
These hypothetical analyses are clearly beyond the scope of econometric 
estimation and we will not attempt to present a conclusion the above 
controversy. The debate serves to illustrate the central role of energy in CMEA 
trade and justifies analysing the effect of the oil price crisis on trade.  
4.  Econometric Approach to Analysis of the CMEA Trade and Oil Price 
Shocks  
Looking at the entire period of the CMEA’s existence, our empirical 
analysis will seek to address the following two questions: How did trade in the 
CMEA develop and what was the effect on its members? How did the oil price 
crisis affect the CMEA? 
4.1 Data 
The estimation of the empirical trade equations uses yearly data from 1950 
to 1990. Trade flow data are taken from statistical yearbooks of the CMEA 
countries.6 These data in national currency units are converted into current US 
                                                 
6 Soviet Union: Ministerstvo Vnešnej Torgovli SSSR, Planovo-ėkonomičeskoe Upravlenie: Vnešniaia 
torgovlia SSSR, Moscow annual issues.  EJCE, vol.9, n.1 (2012) 
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dollars using the official exchange rate. Especially during the first years, however, 
data are not always internally consistent. For the years 1950-1969, therefore, data 
are taken from Marer (1972), who adjusted these trade data of the individual 
CMEA countries into consistent time series. The year 1991 is omitted from the 
data series, as trade was changed to convertible currencies and overall virtually 
collapsed. Romania and the GDR are omitted from the sample as they are both 
exceptions in intra-CMEA trade: Romania, opposed what it perceived to be 
attempts at imposing CMEA over national interests and had unilaterally 
withdrawn from CMEA by the late 1960s. The GDR’s trade pattern differed 
considerably from other CMEA members because of its trade with West 
Germany, therefore, we exclude the GDR from estimations.  
Figure 1 shows trade of the CMEA countries. It confirms several stylized 
facts discussed above. First, trade with the USSR dominated CMEA trade. 
Second, bilateral trade was highly balanced. Third, CMEA trade with the USSR 
expanded in the 1970s, but then stagnated and declined later. Fourth, trade 
among the small CMEA4 countries behaved differently from trade of these 
countries with the USSR. Finally, the CMEA trade with the USSR dropped 
already at the end of the 1980s, that is, before the dissolution of the CMEA. 
The general quality of the data from socialist economies has been the 
subject of criticism both before and after the collapse of communism. The data 
is, however, the only one available and therefore has been widely used, bearing in 
mind the possible distortions. The country-specific estimations use the largest 
possible sample for each country. Correspondingly, the sample starts 
approximately in 1950/1953 and ends in 1988/1990. GDP data in international 
1990 Geary-Khamis dollars are taken from Maddison (2003). In further 
estimations oil prices are added as an additional variable. Yearly nominal prices 
for oil in US dollar are taken from InflationData.7 For the purpose of the 
estimation all data are in logarithms. 
                                                                                                                                        
Bulgaria: Nacionalen Statističeski Institut: Statističeskij godišnik na Narodna Republika Bălgarija, Sofia, 
annual 
Czechoslovakia: Statistická ročenka Československé socialistické republiky, Prague, annual issues.  
Hungary: Hungarian Central Statistical Office: Statistical Yearbook, Budapest 1970-77, 1981-90, data for 
1978-1981 taken from: Vienna Institute of Comparative Economic Studies: Comecon Data 1989, 
Vienna 1990.  
Poland: Główny Urząd Statystyczny: Rocznik statystyczny, Warsaw, annual issues.  
7 Inflation Data, Historical Crude Oil Price: http://www.inflationdata.com/inflation/Inflation_Rate/ 
Historical_Oil_Prices_Table.asp, last accessed: 13/07/08.  E. Beckmann, J. Fidrmuc, Oil Price Shock and Structural Changes in CMEA Trade 
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Figure 1: CMEA Trade, USD Million  
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4.2 Econometric Specification 
Gravity models were originally proposed by Linder (1961) and Linnemann 
(1966). They were constructed similarly to the law of gravity in physics; hence, 
they were also often criticized as an a-theoretical approach to trade analysis. Only 
after more than four decades of intensive use, they received a sound theoretical 
foundation by Anderson and van Wincoop (2003). They were often used for 
modelling trade between Eastern European countries (e.g. De Benedictis et al., 
2005). Econometric analysis proxies force of gravity with trade flows and mass 
with the trading partners’ GDP. In their analysis of structural change in Austrian 
trade with CMEA Fidrmuc et al. (2008) explain exports by income prospects 
through real GDP and terms of trade. However, terms of trade data are not 
available for all CMEA countries during the whole historical period. Therefore, 
this omitted variable will be dealt with by time effects.8 
We will estimate a gravity model with panel data for 5 CMEA countries, the 
Soviet Union and Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland (CMEA4) 
from 1953 to 1990. We will first analyse an overall panel with 20 cross-sections 
and then test these results on a reduced panel with 4 cross-sections for the Soviet 
Union’s exports only. Distance is omitted as a variable from the estimation but 
can be controlled for by fixed effects regression in panel data. Baldwin and 
Taglioni (2006) argue that gravity models should be estimated using nominal 
trade data with time and country-specific dummy variables. Estimation of the 
gravity model will therefore use nominal trade data and three sets of time- and 
country-specific dummy variables:  
it i
t
cmea
it it t
t
cmea
it it t
t
cmea
it it t
cmea
it it y dcm y dxcm y dxsu y x
ε α β
φ δ γ β
+ + +
+ + + + = ∑ ∑ ∑
= = =
0
1990
1954
1990
1954
1990
1954
1
  
(1) 
where xit represents exports from the Soviet Union and CMEA4, ycmea stands for 
the GDPs of the countries of destination of the exports. DXSU, DXCM and 
DCM are the sets of time- and country-specific dummies: A set of yearly dummy 
variables for exports from the Soviet Union to CMEA4 (DXSU), a yearly dummy 
variable for exports from CMEA4 to the Soviet Union (DXCM) and a yearly 
dummy variable for exports among CMEA4 countries (DCM). Each of these 
variables is defined for individual years, e.g. DXSU70 will take on the value one 
for exports from the Soviet Union to CMEA4 in 1970, otherwise be zero, and 
                                                 
8 Imports are not estimated for statistical reasons: In panel data, the demand-oriented variable for 
imports (GDP of the importing country) is the same for every cross section and shows too little 
variance. Trade in a planned economy aimed to be largely balanced, allowing us to draw conclusions 
about import development from export analysis. EJCE, vol.9, n.1 (2012) 
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DXCM70 will be one for exports from each of the CMEA countries to the 
Soviet Union in 1970, otherwise zero.9  
Examining the possibility of a structural break in exports of the CMEA 
countries in the mid 1970s, we applied a modified Chow test for a break at an 
unknown date. The QLR statistic is computed over a trimmed subset of the 
sample from 1958 to 1985 with two restrictions, both for the overall panel with 
20 cross sections and for individual country panels with 4 cross sections each. 
The results, which are available upon request from authors, confirmed a 
structural break around 1975. 
To test results from the gravity model and a structural break in exports, our 
analysis proceeds with country-specific export demand models. This reflects that 
all CMEA countries negotiated individual bilateral agreements. These models use 
panel data with four partners for each of the five countries in the above model. 
The following equation is estimated, 
it i
cmea
it
b cmea
it it y D D y x ε α β β + + + + + = 75 75
1 0          (2) 
where xit denotes exports, ycmea is the GDP of the countries of export destination, 
αi are fixed effects, which capture omitted variables that vary across states but are 
constant over time. We consider a structural break in 1975, which corresponds to 
the oil price crisis. D75 and D75b are dummy variables, which should capture the 
structural change indicated by gravity model results. D75 is equal to zero up to 
1974 and takes on the value of one afterwards. Similarly, D75b takes on the value 
of one for 1975 and 1976 only, and zero otherwise. The former dummy variable 
explains the long-run effects of different trade regimes, while the latter covers 
possible short-term effects during the regime change. The equation is estimated 
using period SUR standard errors and co-variances, which reduces the 
autocorrelation of residuals.  
To analyse the nexus between the change in export demand and world 
energy price increase, an additional variable, world oil price, is added to the 
estimations. Stijns (2003) uses world energy prices in a gravity model to analyse 
the Dutch disease hypothesis. Korhonen and Ledyaeva (2008) document the link 
between trade and oil price in former Soviet Union countries. Oil price is added 
both to equation (1) and equation (2). The non-interacted dummy variable is 
dropped from equation (2) as it is multicollinear with oil prices.  
                                                 
9 In order to avoid multicollinearity problems, the estimation includes the time- and country-specific 
dummy variables as interaction variables only.  E. Beckmann, J. Fidrmuc, Oil Price Shock and Structural Changes in CMEA Trade 
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4.3 Results of Empirical Analysis  
The results of the estimations of equations (1) and (2) for the CMEA panel 
and all individual countries of the sample are summarized in Table 1. 
We can see that income of the importing countries is a significant 
determinant of trade. Actually, this is quite a surprising result given the planning 
system in the CMEA countries. Moreover, the coefficients are comparably high 
in relation to results reported for standard OECD countries (usually close to 
one).10 This can be explained by an excessive orientation of these countries to the 
CMEA and the isolation of these countries. It is also interesting to note that 
income elasticity of Soviet exports to other CMEA countries was especially high. 
The comparably high income elasticities are likely caused by low efficiency of 
communist economies and their high energy intensity. Only Bulgaria and Poland 
showed slightly higher trade effects.  
The income elasticities of Soviet Union become slightly lower if oil price is 
included in the estimation (see Table 2). High oil prices created higher demand 
for Soviet energy exports. This biases upward the income elasticities for the 
Soviet Union, if oil prices are not included in the estimation.  
The dummy and the interacted dummy variables which should capture 
structural change in exports in intra-CMEA trade are significant at the 1% level 
for all countries, except for Hungary. The oil price crisis had two different effects 
on CMEA trade. On the one hand, trade intensity declined during the oil price 
crisis, as indicated by the coefficient for D75b. On the other hand, the signs for 
coefficients of the interacted dummy variable and income in the individual 
CMEA countries are positive, which means that trade reacted more strongly to 
economic developments in the target markets.  
 
 
                                                 
10 Unity income elasticity corresponds to equal distribution of demand between home and foreign 
products.  EJCE, vol.9, n.1 (2012) 
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Table 1: Intra-CMEA Exports, structural break 1975  
Variable   CMEA 
a  Soviet Union 
b Bulgaria 
b Czechoslovakia 
b Hungary 
b Poland 
b 
GDP CMEA 1.33*** 2.21*** 2.70*** 1.68*** 2.15*** 2.36*** 
D75b    -0.61***  -0.45***  -0.43***  -0.02  0.26*** 
D75 GDP CMEA   0.10*** 0.07*** 0.07*** 0.02**  0.03*** 
intercept   -10.46***  -17.71***  -27.70***  -14.13***  -20.72***  -22.29*** 
Adjusted R2 0.97  0.97  0.99  0.96 0.98  0.97 
Observations  760  164  156  152  155  155 
Sample 1953-1990  1953-1988  1955-1988  1956-1988  1953-1988  1953-1988 
Note: The dependent variable is defined as exports of individual CMEA countries. ***/**/* denotes significance at the 1%/5%/10% level, respectively. a – Panel of all CMEA countries 
according to equation (1). The coefficients of dummy interaction variables are reported in Figure 2. b – Panel for the individual CMEA countries according to equation (2).  
 
Table 2: CMEA Trade and World Market Oil Price  
Variable   CMEA 
a  Soviet Union 
b Bulgaria 
b Czechoslovakia 
b Hungary 
b Poland 
b 
GDP CMEA 1.10*** 2.10*** 2.66*** 1.63*** 2.06*** 2.21*** 
D75 GDP CMEA    0.04***  0.04***  0.05***  -0.01  -0.01 
Oil 1.21*** 0.31*** 0.15*** 0.14** 0.20*** 0.28*** 
intercept   -9.23***  -16.95***  -27.44***  -13.77***  -19.86***  -20.84*** 
Adjusted R2 0.97  0.97  0.98 0.96 0.97  0.98 
Observations  760  164  156  152  155  164 
Sample 1953-1990  1950-1990  1952-1990  1953-1990  1950-1990  1950-1990 
Note: The dependent variable is defined as exports of individual CMEA countries. ***/**/* denotes significance at the 1%/5%/10% level, respectively. a – Panel of all CMEA countries 
according to equation (1). The coefficients of dummy interaction variables are not reported. b – Panel for the individual CMEA countries according to equation (2). 
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Figure 2: Gravity Model Coefficients of Dummy Interaction Variables  
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Note: Results for interaction terms (year-specific output elasticities) as specified in equation (1). DXSU – coefficient of 
dummies for exports from the Soviet Union to CMEA4, DXCM – coefficients of dummies for exports from CMEA4 to 
the Soviet Union, DCM – coefficients of dummies for exports among CMEA4 countries. Dummy variables are significant 
from 1968 for DXSU, from 1969 for DXCM and from 1971 for DCM. 
 
Figure 2 plots coefficient values from the regression (1) of the three dummy 
variables interacted with the GDP of the importing countries over the years. As 
all variables are in logarithms, the coefficients can be interpreted as the time-
varying components of output elasticities:11 The results show that the oil price 
crisis influenced the demand for exports from the Soviet Union more than the 
export demand for other CMEA countries. This matches with the fact that the 
Soviet Union was at the centre of the CMEA trading pattern and the largest 
trading partner for all CMEA member countries. Demand for exports from the 
CMEA4 to the Soviet Union was initially larger than that for exports from 
CMEA4 to other CMEA4, but reached a very similar level from the early 1970s 
onwards. Thus, it can be seen that between 1973 and 1975 there was an unusually 
sharp increase in the elasticity of Soviet exports (DXSU). In relation to the early 
1950s in 1975 Soviet exports had increased by 12% - with a 3% increase from 
1974 to 1975. The increase in Soviet exports continued until 1987 (21%). Soviet 
exports then began to decline. The sharp increase in DXSU around 1975 is 
mirrored partly in DXCM (dummy variable for exports from CMEA4 to the 
Soviet Union) with a 9% increase from the early 1950s – 2.3% from 1974 to 
                                                 
11 In particular, an increase of GDP by 1 percent caused trade growth by reported coefficient.  EJCE, vol.9, n.1 (2012) 
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1975. Exports from CMEA member states to the Soviet Union, however, did not 
continue to increase but rather levelled out after 1980 to a maximum of only 11% 
above the initial level and then decreased. DCM (dummy variable for exports 
between CMEA4) shows a much smoother development: An overall increase of 
8.5% from the early 1950s and 1% from 1974 to 1975. To sum up, the 
coefficients show that trade activity picks up after 1956 then develops more 
slowly to increase sharply around 1975. Towards the end of the existence of the 
CMEA there is a marked difference between output elasticities for Soviet exports 
and for CMEA4 exports.  
Altogether, analysis of exports of the five CMEA member countries from 
1950 to 1990 confirms that there was a structural break in CMEA trade during 
this time and this can be associated with the oil crisis.  
After an initially “dormant phase”, trade activity increased after the death of 
Stalin simultaneously with other politically motivated reforms. The energy crisis 
resulted in an increase in trading activity among CMEA member states. The 
response to the crisis was to increase trade among socialist countries, i.e. to turn 
inwards and attempt to withdraw from the world market, to aim for greater 
autarky from the world market. There was a switch from autarky in individual 
communist states to autarky of the bloc. Interestingly, the phase of turning 
inwards was of limited duration with regard to the CMEA4. The Soviet Union 
continued a high level of exports to CMEA4, thereby possibly trying to support 
and keep together its sphere of influence. Results indicate, however, that by the 
early 1980s interest in CMEA trade from the part of the smaller member states 
began to decline and fell sharply by 1986 already (see also Figure 1). This 
corresponds to opening-up of Eastern Europe during the Gorbachev perestroika 
period.  
The effects of the energy crisis were not uniform across countries. The 
higher level of elasticities (Figure 2) for exports from the Soviet Union suggests 
that the Soviet Union was the dominant energy exporter and strengthened its 
central position after the energy crisis.  
The effect on the Soviet Union was different to that on CMEA4. Table 1 
shows that trade elasticity increased more in the Soviet Union (increase by 8 
percentage points) after 1975 than in any other CMEA country. Figure 2 
confirms that the energy crisis had different repercussions on Eastern European 
trade than on Soviet trade.  
Hungary, as far as the statistical analysis is concerned, was not significantly 
affected by the oil price crisis during the 1970s. There are various possible 
reasons for this “immunity” of Hungary. Firstly, it might well be that change, 
even though it occurred, happened much more gradually in Hungary’s case. 
Secondly, Hungary was the most liberalised economy of the CMEA4, which 
could have had the effect of a quicker, compensating response of the domestic 
economy. For example, Hungarian energy consumption was lowest in E. Beckmann, J. Fidrmuc, Oil Price Shock and Structural Changes in CMEA Trade 
 
Available online at http://eaces.liuc.it 
47
comparison to the other countries. Moreover, Hungary received a 700-million-
ruble credit from the Soviet Union to cover the increased cost of oil imports 
between 1976 and 1980 (Stone 1996, p. 55). Correspondingly, Hungary was 
possibly less affected by oil price crisis than developed economies.  
In general, however, individual country results do not give reason to 
confirm that the Soviet policy was to shield one of the CMEA members more 
than another from the effects of the energy crisis, which could have lent support 
to the Marrese and Vanous (1983) arguments discussed in section 3.  
Adding oil price as a variable to the overall gravity model in equation (1) 
and the individual countries’ demand models in (2) confirms that world oil prices 
are a significant determinant of internal exports of the CMEA countries.12 Our 
results (see Table 2) confirm that oil prices are a significant determinant of 
exports between CMEA countries. For Hungary, the interacted dummy variable 
hypothesising structural change in 1975 remains not significant, as in the 
estimation of the demand model without oil prices. In Poland, the interacted 
GDP variable becomes insignificant. However, oil prices are significant for 
exports of both countries, which confirms the importance of the oil shock for 
these two countries, as well. For all other countries, both oil prices as well as the 
interacted dummy variable remain highly significant. Coefficient values in 
comparison to the demand model results without oil prices are approximately 
halved. With the exception of Poland, the coefficient for the oil price is highest 
for the Soviet Union. The oil price crisis contributed to the inward orientation of 
the CMEA trade. Correspondingly, world oil prices have significant and positive 
effects on CMEA trade, because CMEA countries had to balance their trade with 
the Soviet Union (Tolonen, 1988).  
5.  Conclusions 
Econometric analysis of Soviet foreign trade with the CMEA countries 
confirmed that there was a structural break in intra-CMEA trade around the first 
energy crisis. The change in energy policy in the CMEA, however, was not in the 
form of radical restructuring. It was characteristic of the time where the Soviet 
Union had entered a phase of “stagnation”. The response to the energy crisis in 
the form of “turning inwards” could be interpreted as one last attempt by the 
Soviet Union to shield itself and the states under its influence from external 
influences. From the perspective of the smaller states, one could argue that this 
policy – if only for a limited time – met national economic interests for cheaper 
oil. Ultimately, however, it delayed necessary more radical reforms, which smaller 
member states might have realized when they began to turn away from the 
                                                 
12 Adding oil prices to the estimation seems to distort coefficients for the time- and country-specific 
dummies. The reason for this could be that oil price change over the years is correlated with the time 
dummies, even though these are added to the equation only as interacted dummies.  EJCE, vol.9, n.1 (2012) 
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CMEA by the mid 1980s already. The change in 1973, therefore, was not one of 
successful restructuring but one preceding the disintegration of the CMEA.  
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